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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
On appeal, Ms. Youmans asserted:  (1) the district court abused its discretion by 
admitting the testimony of Officer Kip Paporello regarding the identification of the pills 
found on Ms. Youmans, due to the State’s failure to lay a proper foundation for the 
testimony; (2) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Youmans 
possessed a controlled substance without a valid prescription; (3) the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing unified sentences of ten years with three years fixed 
and five years, with three years fixed, upon Ms. Youmans, for her convictions for 
burglary and attempted burglary; and (4) the district court was without jurisdiction to 
make any factual findings related to the prosecutorial misconduct1 alleged in the Notice 
of Appeal after Ms. Youmans timely appealed to this Court.  Both the Ada County 
Prosecutor’s Office (“County”) and the Attorney General’s Office (“AG”) filed briefs in 
response.2   
                                            
1 In footnote 6, the County infers the presence of evil intent upon Ms. Youmans based 
upon her use of the term “prosecutorial misconduct” in the Appellant’s Brief.  To 
undersigned counsel’s knowledge, “prosecutorial misconduct’ is a term of art universally 
used by the United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and the Idaho Court of Appeals.  Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004); 
United States v. Alcantara-Castillo, 788 P.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2015); State v. Langford, 
2016 Opinion No. 82 (2016); State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445 (2012); and State v. 
Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635 (Ct. App. 2011).  In fact, as recently as July 22, 2016, in 
Lankford, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court used the term “prosecutorial misconduct” 19 
times in a case where the Idaho Supreme Court reversed a first degree murder 
conviction based upon a prosecutor withholding certain evidence.  A claim that the 
prosecuting attorney improperly withheld and failed to disclose pertinent evidence to the 
defense is a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. See Lankford, supra.    
2 Because the County and the AG disagree about whether the district court had 
jurisdiction to make additional findings of fact after the filing of a Notice of Appeal, 
Ms. Youmans will refer to them as separate parties in her Appellant’s Reply Brief, rather 
than as just “the State.”  
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This Reply Brief is necessary to address the County’s argument on appeal that 
Ms. Youmans’ claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear additional evidence 
and make new factual findings related to a pretrial issue following the timely filing of a 
notice of appeal, is moot and an improper attempt to seek an advisory opinion.  
Ms. Youmans’ claim that the district court was without jurisdiction is not moot as the 
requested relief, that offered evidence and findings be stricken from the record, is 
available to the district court regardless of whether an issue was raised on appeal 
regarding the allegation of prosecutorial misconduct.  Even if the mootness doctrine is 
applicable, because Ms. Youmans has the possibility of suffering collateral legal 
consequences, this Court should address the merits of her claim.  Finally, the AG is 
correct that the district court was without jurisdiction to make any factual findings 
alleged in the Amended Notice of Appeal after Ms. Youmans timely appealed to this 
Court. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Youmans’ Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES3 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony of Officer Kip 
Paporello regarding the identification of the pills found on Ms. Youmans, due to 
the State’s failure to lay proper foundation for the testimony? 
 
2. Was there insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Ms. Youmans possessed a controlled substance without a valid prescription? 
 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing unified sentences of ten 
years, with three years fixed and five years, with two years fixed fixed, upon 
Ms. Youmans’ convictions for burglary and attempted burglary, to be served 
concurrently, in light of the mitigating factors present in the case? 
 
4. Was the district court without jurisdiction to make any factual findings related to 
the prosecutorial misconduct alleged in the Notice of Appeal, after Ms. Youmans 
timely appealed to this Court? 
 
 
                                            
3 Ms. Youmans’ Appellant’s Reply Brief will only address the County’s argument that her 
jurisdictional claim is moot and that district court had jurisdiction to entertain the State’s 
Motion to Supplement the Record as the remaining arguments by the AG are 
unremarkable. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
 
The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To Make Any Factual Findings Related To 
The Prosecutorial Misconduct Alleged In The Notice Of Appeal After Ms. Youmans 
Timely Appealed To This Court 
 
A. Ms. Youmans’ Jurisdictional Argument Is Not Moot 
On appeal, while the AG agrees the district court was without jurisdiction, both 
the County and the AG argue the issue raised by Ms. Youmans is moot because 
Ms. Youmans did not raise a claim on appeal that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
by withholding evidence from the defense.  (AG Respondent’s Brief, pp.14-15; County 
Respondent’s Brief, pp.10-11.)  Specifically, the AG asserts because the “allegation that 
the prosecutor withheld evidence” was not raised on appeal, then a “determination of 
whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider the additional evidence offered by 
the prosecutor below . . . will have no practical effect upon the outcome of the case.”  
(AG Respondent’s Brief, p.15.)  Likewise, the County argues, “by electing not to pursue 
her evidence-withholding issues, she mooted this issue because there is no longer a 
substantive underlying appellate issue for the parties to brief and argue.”  (County 
Respondent’s Brief, p.10.)  Both parties assert that Ms. Youmans is merely seeking an 
advisory option. (AG Respondent’s Brief, p.20; County Respondent’s Brief, p.4.) The 
AG and County are incorrect 
Mootness precludes appellate review on an issue that presents no justiciable 
controversy and where a judicial determination would have no practical effect on the 
outcome.  Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 
Idaho 276, 281 (1996); Storm v. Spaulding, 137 Idaho 145, 148 (Ct. App. 2002). A party 
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lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome when even a favorable judicial 
decision would not result in relief. Freeman v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 138 Idaho 872, 875 
(Ct. App. 2003).  Whether a case should be dismissed for mootness is a question of 
law, subject to free review. Storm, 137 Idaho at 148. 
Here, both the AG and the County fail to recognize the relief Ms. Youmans is 
seeking, with regard to her claim the district court did not have jurisdiction to 
supplement the record, is that all evidence offered after Ms. Youmans filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal should be removed from the record.  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.21-22.)  
Thus, Ms. Youmans has a legally cognizable interest in a favorable decision because if 
this Court agrees the district court was without jurisdiction, the remedy would be to 
strike all evidence offered and findings of fact made after the filing of the Notice of 
Appeal.  In other words, a favorable decision would result Ms. Youmans obtaining the 
relief she requested.   
Moreover, the instant appeal likely represents the only opportunity for 
Ms. Youmans to address the improperly offered and accepted evidence.  When the 
county prosecutor offered the evidence, Ms. Youmans objected.  (7/7/15 Tr., p.4, Ls.2-
10, p.5, Ls.4-8; R., pp.315-319.)  Thus, the issue is preserved for review by this Court, 
as Ms. Youmans’ timely entered an objection to the introduction of the challenged 
evidence.  See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).  If Ms. Youmans failed to 
raise her claim on direct appeal, it will be deemed to have been waived for purposes of 
post-conviction relief.  See Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 462 (Ct. App. 2009).  Thus, 
the instant direct appeal is Ms. Youmans’ last opportunity to remedy the improper 
augmentation of new evidence and facts into the appellate record.   
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Finally, if this Court does not strike the improper evidence as a remedy in this 
appeal, it will be before the district court and properly considered in the event 
Ms. Youmans needs to, and is ultimately required to file a petition for post-conviction 
relief to seek additional relief not obtained on direct appeal.  Accordingly, in light of the 
foregoing, the mootness document is inapplicable to the circumstances presented in the 
instant case. 
 
B. Assuming Arguendo, That This Court Determines The Mootness Doctrine 
Applies, Because There Is The Possibility Of Collateral Legal Consequences, 
This Court Should Address The Merits Of Ms. Youmans’ Jurisdictional Claim 
 
Even where a question is moot, there are three exceptions to the mootness 
doctrine:  (1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on 
the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial 
review and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises 
concerns of substantial public interest. State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8 (2010).   
Here, if this Court determines the mootness doctrine is applicable because she 
failed to argue the alleged prosecutorial misconduct issue, Ms. Youmans has the 
possibility of suffering collateral legal consequences.  Without a legal determination as 
to whether the district court had jurisdiction to conduct an evidentiary hearing related to 
the alleged prosecutor misconduct, the evidence offered and findings entered, will 
remain in the district court record.  Thus, if Ms. Youmans attempts to raise a claim that 
her trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to properly allege 
and litigate the prosecutorial misconduct claim, Ms. Youmans will most likely be 
foreclosed because the district court will have already made factual findings based upon 
evidence offered by the prosecutor.  If the evidence offered and findings of fact entered 
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regarding the claim of prosecutorial misconduct for allegedly withholding evidence are 
allowed to remain in the record, Ms. Youmans will have suffered collateral legal 
consequences with no available relief.   
Accordingly, because the district court was without jurisdiction to consider 
additional evidence and supplement the record this case, this Court should remove from 
the record all of the State’s legal filings related to this issue from the date of 
Ms. Youmans’ December 15, 2014 Notice of Appeal and all evidence offered and 
findings made by the district court should be stricken and not considered by any court in 
any future proceedings related to this case. 
 
C. The District Court Was Without Jurisdiction To Make Any Factual Findings 
Related To The Prosecutorial Misconduct Alleged In The Notice Of Appeal After 
Ms. Youmans Timely Appealed To This Court 
 
As to the merits of Ms. Youmans’ claim that the district court was without 
jurisdiction to hear additional evidence and make any factual findings after she timely 
filed a Notice of Appeal, the AG concedes that “the district court was without jurisdiction 
to consider the additional evidence.  Generally, once a notice of appeal has been filed, 
the district court lacks jurisdiction to take any action in a case except as permitted by 
Idaho Appellate Rule 13.”  (AG Respondent’s Brief, p.15, citing State v. Lemmons, 158 
Idaho 971 (2015).)  The County, on the other hand, argues that “the district court had 
jurisdiction to consider the additional discovery matters.”  (County Respondent’s Brief, 
p.13.)   
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1. The County Prosecutor Does Not Have A Due Process Right To 
Supplement The Record In The District Court Following A Timely Filing Of 
A Notice Of Appeal 
 
The County relies first upon the general notion of due process.  (County 
Respondent’s Brief, pp.13-4 (citing Cleveland Bd. Of Educ.v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 
542 (1985).)  Specifically, the County asserts,  
When a charge of misconduct is made against a prosecutor it carries a 
very real threat to that prosecutor’s license and continued employment.  
Given the potential and severe repercussions that may be visited upon the 
prosecutor charged with the violations, he or she is entitled to an 
opportunity to present the actual facts and have the court make a finding 
as to whether there is merit to the allegations.   
 
(County’s Respondent’s Brief, p.14.)  Along the same lines, the County continues, 
“allegations of this nature can be damaging to the prosecutor’s good name, reputation, 
honor[,] and integrity, which also invokes the constitutional right to be heard.[ ]” (County 
Respondent’s Brief, p.14 (footnote omitted).)   
The error in the County’s logic is it starts from a faulty assumption, that 
Ms. Tamara Kelly, the prosecutor in the underlying criminal trial, is a party to this 
litigation, thereby creating some sort of life, liberty, or property interest that is at stake in 
the instant appeal.  See generally Cleveland Bd. Of Educ.v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 
542 (1985); see also Idaho Appellate Rule 7.1.  Ms. Kelly does not have any “life, 
liberty, or property interest” that is in any way affected by Ms. Youmans’ direct appeal.  
Regardless of the outcome of this appeal, this Court cannot take any action to deprive 
Ms. Kelly of her life, liberty or property interest in this direct appeal.  The same is true as 
related to Ms. Kelly’s good name as her “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity” is 
not “at stake because of what the government is doing to” her.  Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (emphasis added). 
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Further, the County’s argument is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Even assuming Ms. Kelly has a liberty interest at stake, 
Ms. Youmans has no power to deprive Ms. Kelly of whatever protection the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides.  Ms. Youmans is a private citizen – she is not the government. 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides Ms. Kelly with identified rights and protections 
from certain governmental actions – it does not protect her from the actions of non-
governmental actors.  See e.g. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  Moreover, it 
appears as though Ms. Kelly’s concerns are premature: if she eventually faces 
contempt of court charges and/or faces disciplinary sanctions from the Idaho State Bar, 
she will be provided with notice of the allegations she faces, and an opportunity to rebut 
those allegations.  See Idaho Criminal Rule 42 (Rule governing contempt proceedings 
brought in connection with a criminal proceeding); Idaho Bar Commission Rules § V 
(rules governing review of alleged professional misconduct).  If she gets fired, disbarred, 
or her name is no longer good, it will not be because something listed as a potential 
issue in a properly filed Notice of Appeal, rather, it will be because a neutral and 
detached district court judge, and/or a bar disciplinary hearing committee, found 
Ms. Kelly’s actions to be contemptuous or in violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  Thus, Ms. Kelly will get all of the due process to which she is entitled under 
the Fourteenth Amendment if she faces contempt of court charges and/or faces 
disciplinary sanctions from the Idaho State Bar. 
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2. There Is No Authority That Would Grant The District Court Jurisdiction To 
Supplement The Record On Appeal Based Upon The Facts And 
Circumstances Of This Case 
 
As is noted above, the AG concedes the district court was without jurisdiction to 
make the findings it did in the instant case after Ms. Youmans filed her timely Notice of 
Appeal.  The County, however, argues both “the applicable statutes and rules provide 
otherwise.”  Specifically, the County first argues that Idaho Appellate Rule (“I.A.R.”) 
13(c)(4) provides such authority: 
Subsection 13(c)(4) of the Rule allows a court to “[c]onduct any hearing, 
and make any order, decision or judgment allowed or permitted by § 19-
2601, Idaho Code.”  Idaho Code 19-2601 explains that the district court 
may “suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first 
three hundred sixty-five (365) days of a sentence” and that the court 
“retains jurisdiction of the prisoner” during that period. 
 
(County Respondent’s Brief, pp.16-17.)  The County then surmises that because the 
district court retained jurisdiction over Ms. Youmans it “clearly had jurisdiction” to 
supplement the record from the underlying trial.  (County Respondent’s Brief, p.17.)  In 
so arguing, the County relies on an incomplete recitation of the appellate rule and 
applicable statute to which it cites.   
This Court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo.  State v. Schwartz, 
139 Idaho 360, 362 (2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 894–96 (2011).  “The interpretation of a 
statute ‘must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their 
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole.  If 
the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law 
as written.’”  Verska, 151 Idaho at 893 (quoting Schwartz, 139 Idaho at 362 (citations 
omitted)).  If a statute is ambiguous because it is capable of more than one reasonable 
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interpretation, then the Court looks to the rules of statutory construction to determine the 
legislature’s intent.  Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 299–300 (1986) (abrogated in part 
on other grounds by Verska, 151 Idaho at 894–96); Bonner City v. Cunningham, 156 
Idaho 291, 295 (Ct. App. 2014).  “To determine that intent, we examine not only the 
literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the 
public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history.”  Schwartz, 139 Idaho at 362; 
see also I.C. § 73-113. 
 Idaho Appellate Rule 13(c) is titled, “Stay Upon Appeal – Powers of the District 
Court – Criminal Actions” and provides:  
In criminal actions, unless prohibited by order of the Supreme Court, the 
district court shall have the power and authority to rule upon the following 
motions and to take the following actions during the pendency of an 
appeal[.]   
… 
(4) Conduct any hearing and make any order, decision or judgment 
allowed or permitted by § 19-2601, Idaho Code.”   
 
I.A.R. 13(c)(4) (emphasis added).  Idaho Code § 19-2601(4), which addresses the 
district court’s ability to retain jurisdiction over a defendant, provides: 
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of 
guilty, in any district court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against 
the laws of the state, except those of treason or murder, the court in its 
discretion may: 
 
(4) Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first 
three hundred sixty-five (365) days of a sentence to the custody of 
the state board of correction. The court shall retain jurisdiction over 
the prisoner for a period of up to the first three hundred sixty-five 
(365) days. Except as provided for in section 19-2601A, Idaho 
Code, during the period of retained jurisdiction, the state board of 
correction shall be responsible for determining the placement of the 
prisoner and such education, programming and treatment as it 
determines to be appropriate. The prisoner will remain committed to 
the board of correction if not affirmatively placed on probation by 
the court. In extraordinary circumstances, where the court 
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concludes that it is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant 
information within the period of retained jurisdiction, or where the 
court concludes that a hearing is required and is unable to obtain 
the defendant’s presence for such a hearing within such period, the 
court may decide whether to place the defendant on probation or 
release jurisdiction within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty 
(30) days, after the period of retained jurisdiction has expired. 
Placement on probation shall be under such terms and conditions 
as the court deems necessary and appropriate. The court in its 
discretion may sentence a defendant to more than one (1) period of 
retained jurisdiction after a defendant has been placed on probation 
in a case or following release from commitment to the department 
of juvenile corrections pursuant to section 19-2601A, Idaho Code. 
In no case shall the board of correction or its agent, the department 
of correction, be required to hold a hearing of any kind with respect 
to a recommendation to the court for the grant or denial of 
probation. Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the 
court. Any recommendation made by the state board of correction 
to the court regarding the prisoner shall be in the nature of an 
addendum to the presentence report. The board of correction and 
its agency, the department of correction, and their employees shall 
not be held financially responsible for damages, injunctive or 
declaratory relief for any recommendation made to the district court 
under this section. 
 
IDAHO CODE § 19-2601(4) (2015) (emphasis added). Contrary to the County’s position, 
when read together I.A.R. 13(c)(4) and I.C. § 19-2601(4), only give the district court 
authority power and authority to conduct any hearing or making any order, decision, or 
judgment as it relates to the 365 day period of retained jurisdiction Ms. Youmans was 
serving.  Contrarily, the district court in this case held a hearing, heard evidence, and 
made findings related to a pretrial issue after Ms. Youmans had been convicted and 
judgment had been entered in the case.  The district court’s jurisdiction in the instant 
case was limited to deciding whether to hold a hearing at the conclusion of 
Ms. Youmans’ rider and determining whether she was a suitable candidate for probation 
or should remain committed to the Idaho Department of Corrections. See State v. 
Taylor, 142 Idaho 30, 31 (2005).  Thus, any finding or order unrelated to the 
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determination of whether to place Ms. Youmans on probation or relinquish jurisdiction 
was outside the scope of the district court’s permissible authority. 
Next, the County argues that I.A.R. 13(c)(10) provides a basis for the district 
court’s jurisdiction to have a factual hearing and make findings.  Idaho Appellate Rule 
13(c)(10) provides that “the district court shall have the power and authority” to “[e]nter 
any other order after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant as 
authorized by law.”  I.A.R. 13(c)(10).  Relying on State v. Wade4 and State v. Wilson5 
the County argues that I.A.R. 13(c)(10) is a “catch-all” provision “couched in ‘broad 
language’” that provides the district court with authority go back and make a “complete 
and accurate record” of issues arising in a case long after the judgment has been 
entered.  (County Respondent’s Brief, pp.19.)  Effectively, the County is advocating that 
I.A.R. 13(c)(10) gives a district court authority to supplement the district court record in 
every case to make a “complete and accurate record” as necessary to reach a “just 
outcome.”  (County Respondent’s Brief, pp.19-20.)  The County is mistaken. 
In Wade, the Court of Appeals was clear to hold that “I.A.R. 13(c)(10) was 
intended was intended to give the district court jurisdiction to rule upon a motion that 
has been inadvertently overlooked or that was pending, but not yet decided, when the 
notice of appeal was filed.”  125 Idaho at 524.  However, the Wade Court cautioned, 
“after an appeal is filed, a district court in a criminal proceeding may enter an order on a 
motion filed prior to the appeal where such ruling merely completes the record and does 
not in any way alter an order or judgment from which the appeal has been taken.”  Id.
                                            
4 State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522 (Ct. App. 1994). 
5 State v. Wilson, 136 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 2001). 
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(emphsis added).)  The actions taken by the district court in this case, were not 
necessary to rule upon an overlooked motion or a motion that had been filed 
immediately prior to the notice of appeal and did in fact alter the judgment from which 
the appeal was taken.   
Likewise, the Court of Appeals Opinion in Wilson does not support the County’s 
position.  In Wilson, the defendant pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance, filed 
a timely notice of appeal, and then filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea one day 
after filing the notice of appeal.  136 Idaho at 772.  The district court concluded that it 
lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Id. 
The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the district court did have jurisdiction to 
entertain the motion to withdraw the guilty plea because it is a motion “’authorized by 
law’ and because an order on such a motion affects ‘the substantial rights of the 
defendant.’”  Id. at 773.  Here, the district court was not acting on a motion “authorized 
by law,” but rather a request by the County to reopen a case to made additional factual 
findings.  Moreover, the district court did not enter any additional order and it certainly 
action was necessary to affect “the substantial rights of the defendant.”  Id. 
Most recently, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed an issues substantially 
similar to the argument the County now raises on appeal.  See State v. Lemmons, 158 
Idaho 971 (2015).  In Lemmons, following his convictions for two counts of trafficking in 
methamphetamine by delivering methamphetamine and trafficking in methamphetamine 
by conspiring to deliver methamphetamine, Lemmons filed a motion for judgment of 
acquittal .  158 Idaho at 973.  The district court entered an order denying the motion for 
judgment of acquittal, but granted a motion for a new trial.  Id.  The State filed a notice 
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of appeal.  Id. at 974.  The day after the State filed a notice of appeal, Lemmons filed a 
motion for reconsideration asking the district court to grant the acquittal rather than the 
new trial, which was granted by the district court.  Id.   
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court’s order granting 
Lemmons motion to reconsider was void “because the district court did not have 
jurisdiction to enter the order.”  Id. The Court observed that upon the filing of the notice 
of appeal, “the district court ‘lost jurisdiction over the entire action except as provided in 
Rule 13 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.’”  Id (citing Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 
804 (2010)).  The Court then observed that I.A.R. 13 “does not permit a court to grant a 
motion for reconsideration or a motion for acquittal.”  Id.  Accordingly, just as a motion to 
reconsideration is not permissible under I.A.R. 13, so too is the Motion to Supplement 
the Record filed by the County in the instant case and as a result, the district court was 
without jurisdiction to entertain it. 
 If, as the County asserts, a district court is permitted to reopen a case, hear 
additional factual evidence, and make new factual findings to ensure a “complete and 
adequate record’ as necessary for a “just outcome,” it is not only prosecutors that would 
be entitled to those procedures.  Rather, defendants would be entitled to reopen their 
cases after the filing of a notice of appeal and district courts would be required to hold 
hearings, hear additional evidence, and make new factual findings on those issues that 
were not adequately or completely litigated.  See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 476 
(1973).  Thus, many, if not most claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could be 
litigated on direct appeal whereby appellate counsel would be able to identify motions 
that should have been filed, or objections that could have been made and obtain 
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supplemental factual determinations in the district court.  Thereafter, with a “complete 
and accurate record,” those issues, which otherwise would have to be raised in post-
conviction, could now be raised on direct appeal.  If the County is correct, it may impose 
upon appellate counsel an ethical duty to review the record and transcripts to identify 
claims that were incorrectly preserved or should have been raised, and move to stay the 
appeal pending an offer of additional evidence and new factual findings to insure a 
“complete and accurate record.”   
 Accordingly, the district court was without jurisdiction to make the additional 
findings in the instant case after Ms. Youmans filed her timely Notice of Appeal.  
Assuming arguendo, that the County is correct a district court has jurisdiction to 
entertain additional evidence and make new factual findings to insure a “just outcome,” 
that procedural right should be reciprocal and apply equally to criminal defendants 
whose liberty interests are truly at stake and are entitled to the same procedural 
protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.  See Wardius, 412 U.S. at 476. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Youmans respectfully requests that this Court vacate her convictions for 
burglary, attempted burglary, and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance.  
Alternatively, Ms. Youmans requests that this Court vacate her sentences and remand 
the case to the district court with instructions that it withhold judgment over her.  
Alternatively, Ms. Youmans requests that this Court reduce her sentences as it deems 
appropriate.  Additionally, Ms. Youmans requests that this Court strike all filing by the 
State, any additional evidence offered, and all findings by the district court related to the 
potential claim that the State withheld the computer hard drive in this case and/or 
denied her defense counsel access to the same. 
 DATED this 4th day of August, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
      Interim State Appellate Public Defender 
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